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Notes on ‘America Abroad’ 
 
 Great Britain – the United Kingdom – call it what you will, has for many years been 
engaged in an geopolitical game of Twister. It is the founder turned junior partner to an ever 
more formidable United States. It is at the same time a European power (though the 
anachronism of the Security Council allows it a most improbable swagger on the world 
stage). A political debate is embodied in this contradiction. Should Britain embrace the 
American brand of free market capitalism – with its safety net so low that any citizen who 
takes the plunge touches the ground before the upswing? Or should it adopt, with reforming 
zeal, the continental traditions of social democracy and state interference?  
This dilemma does not exist – or at least, does not exist as strongly – for many other 
European countries. They are not bound, by language and history, to define themselves in 
relation to vast America; though everybody does, to some extent. For this reason, a British 
perception of the United States may illuminate some facets of that vast and contradictory 
nation. 
 I first want to dispense with the political myth – much vaunted in Britain, less valued 
in the States – of the so-called ‘special relationship’. It is true that the two nations meet in 
the ideological dance of history. Candid thinkers on the political Right might agree with 
James Joyce who, in his lectures in Trieste, described Robinson Crusoe as a blueprint for 
Anglo-Americanism: the battle against nature, the pursuit of material wealth in fulfilment of 
Providence, the lofty presumption of a right to power. In this context, former rivalries have 
been consigned to dust, replaced by a mutually satisfying sense of kinship. Thus we have the 
American invocation of Winston Churchill to justify George Bush’s adventures in Iraq. The 
same capitalist oligarchs brush against the vestiges of the English aristocracy, mixing their 
‘class’ with English ‘style’ as though to ennoble themselves by association. The British, in 
return, console themselves for the loss of Empire by becoming the prime sycophant of the 
new imperial power: Britain’s Greece to America’s Rome (Macmillan’s formulation) or 
Britain’s Rome, perhaps, to America’s Byzantium. 
The special relationship, then, signifies convenience to America and desperate fear of 
marginalisation by Britain. It is a fabrication – in many ways pernicious – of vested interests 
on either side of the Atlantic. Yet it seems to me that it has a real and dynamic counterpart 
in cultural terms. 
 It began, perhaps, with a New World sense of inferiority. The American novel 
needed Melville and Twain to find its ‘native’ amplitude, while the turn of the century saw 
Henry James and T.S. Eliot gravitate towards civilised and canonical England. There can be 
a strange anachronism in American uses of British culture. Still today, Republican politicians 
will recruit Rudyard Kipling as the authority on ‘freedom loving’ militarism, though his 
political star has long since waned in Britain. The British radical tradition may have 
nourished the American Revolution but, with notable exceptions, it seems to me that only 
conservative thought still travels from the old country to the new. The dominant flow of 
influence, now, is from West to East. 
 The cultural domination, in Europe, of 17th century Spain or 18th century France 
cannot hope to rival the international influence of the United States in the past century. 
Think of jazz music, of the blues and rock. Think of modern art, relocating from Paris to 
Manhattan. Think – if you can bear to – of film and television. Today, American mastery in 
the audio-visual domain is a fact of global life. For my own country, this is sometimes 
positive, acting as a spur to British invention. More often, however, the effect is negative, 
resulting in the financial stranglehold of US distributors and the effacing of cinematic 
traditions by pale imitations of American popcorn: Scarface limping up the Ball’s Pond 
Road. What do US audiences – with all those dollars in their jeans – see of Britain? The 
weary clichés of royalty and engaging toffs in country houses. What, in return, do Britons see 
of America? Dross and vulgarity, of course. But also much of value; and even mediocre 
American screen narratives manage to convey something of ordinary, domestic life, which 
rarely survives in British cinema outside the works of Ken Loach and Mike Leigh. 
 More interesting to me, however, is the influence of the American on the British 
novel. Browbeaten by Modernism, forced in upon itself by the apprehension of national 
decline and the precepts of social realism, the British novel looked, in the ’70s and ’80s, to 
America for its liberation. The muscularity of Philip Roth, the Dickensian scope of Saul 
Bellow, offered writers like Martin Amis or Salman Rushdie an alternative to parochialism. 
Here was a prose that balked at nothing, mixing high and low culture, the literary with the 
demotic. Once again, everything human became fair territory.  
The response of critics to this influence suggests the ambivalence of British attitudes 
towards the United States. It may be characterised as a mixture of enthusiasm and snobbery. 
The present backlash against what one might call the Mid-Atlanticists (Amis chief among 
them) declares their work to be too sprawling, inchoate and self-regarding. In a word, vulgar. 
‘We may not have cultural superiority,’ the consolation goes, ‘but we still have greater 
refinement.’ This seems to me a form of bravado masking a deep anxiety. Tony Blair, as he 
received his standing ovation from Congress, manifested a very British desire for American 
approval. The Beatles had truly made it when they cracked America. We may produce good 
novels, or television sitcoms, but we can’t be sure of their value until they are praised across 
the Atlantic. 
There is, of course, and always has been, a reciprocal force. One has only to note the 
unmerited authority conferred by many Americans on the nearest, plummy English accent. 
Plenty of charmers and sycophants have found niches in Hollywood or Manhattan, as Tom 
Wolfe acidly observes in The Bonfire of the Vanities. 
 
One had the sense of a very rich and suave secret legion that had insinuated  
itself into the cooperative apartment houses of Park Avenue and Fifth Avenue, 
from there to pounce at will upon the Yankees’ fat fowl, to devour at leisure  
the last plump white meat on the bones of capitalism… They were comrades  
in arms, in the service of Great Britain’s wounded chauvinism. 
 
The balance of influence, however, remains unequal. America is the lodestone to British 
eyes; it is also the prism in which we see ourselves vindicated or ridiculed. Being the crucible 
in which the future – dystopian or utopian – is assembled, it is the dream we aspire to and 
the nightmare we dread. 
This wary eye has long been turned on America by the inhabitants of my crowded 
island. Charles Dickens, when he crossed the Atlantic in the 1840s, was disappointed by 
what he found. The continuance of slavery, in contradiction of America’s founding ideals, 
struck him as gross hypocrisy; he struggled with the discrepancy between national myths and 
daily reality. It is a disappointment expressed by many visitors since; but it is no absolution 
of America’s vices to suggest that such disappointment is largely a consequence of the 
world’s unreasonable hopes of America. Repression and poverty, the promise of religious 
freedom in a country unburdened by ancient failures – all these have driven immigrants to 
these shores. The myth (with its large part of truth) retains its potency, and sits 
uncomfortably with the counter-realities of genocide and civil strife.  
Why does the world continue to expect of America that it be untarnished? Perhaps 
it’s because America loudly proclaims its virtue. Complexity is antithetical to the image of 
itself that it wishes to project. And the British – like most Europeans – collude in this 
simplification. We tend to forget the country’s size and variety. How would an Irish farmer 
like to be mistaken for a Greek fisherman? Smaller and more homogeneous national 
societies tend to simplify a country which lacks such homogeneity. And perhaps this suggests 
one British advantage over the superpower; for mine is a country small enough to have 
something resembling a national discourse – and a national culture, though characterised by 
a happy diversity. 
Many Americans seem to regard their country with little scepticism. Certainly there is 
much, in two centuries of national and international struggle, for the United States to be 
proud of. But a progressive reputation cannot be sustained by reactionary policies. After 
9/11, a fervent hope swept Europe that the ‘America First’ mentality of the Bush 
administration would be replaced by a new internationalism – a readiness, by the US, to 
power multilateral solutions to global problems, rather than hinder or scupper them, as it 
had the Kyoto Treaty. Instead, we’ve had American unilateralism: a pushy simulacrum of 
diplomacy filling the media hiatus before ineluctable war in Iraq; a cynical indifference to 
climate change, to which the US is by far the world’s biggest contributor; a petulant rejection 
of international treaties on biological and chemical weapons, on landmines and child labour; 
and a reluctance to help AIDS-afflicted Africa in the one most effective way: relaxing patents 
on anti-retroviral drugs. It is one of the miracles of Bush diplomacy that it has managed, in 
the course of eighteen months, to squander the universal sympathy that it received following 
the terrorist outrages. This is due in no small part to an imperious disregard for world 
opinion. British television, for instance, hosted few calm, moderate, reasoned ambassadors 
for Bush’s policy on Iraq. Instead, Richard Perle greased our screens, treating all opponents 
with lofty contempt. What has happened to the business of persuasion? American power is 
such – the Neo-Cons appear to say – that we don’t need friends. The parlous aftermath of 
war in Iraq puts paid to this dangerous illusion.  
For generations, the world has pinned its hopes on America. One thinks of 
wilderness and landscape; of the bustling city, home to jazz and infinite stories; of freedoms 
and opportunities unequalled on most of the planet. When the ambitions of America’s 
leaders are reduced to the fulfilment of narrow self-interest, is it any wonder that the world 
should despair of its dream country? Among the million Britons – myself included – who 
marched against Bush’s war in London in February, far more suffered from bruised love 
than prejudiced hate. 
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